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ABSTRACT
In response to the Supreme Court's failure to grant writ of certiorari to Federal Trade
Commission v. Schering-Plough Corp., Congress proposed the Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act to once again amend the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. Traditionally, the courts
have used two antitrust standards, the rule of reason and the per se illegal rule, to determine
whether a reverse payment patent settlement restrains trade. In Scheiring-Plough, the
Eleventh Circuit articulated a third standard and held the reverse payment settlements
between a pioneer drug company and two generic drug companies valid. This article proposes
that traditional analysis of the rule of reason must be uniformly applied to determine the
validity of reverse payment patent settlements under the antitrust laws and the proposed
amendment will neither enhance competition nor benefit the public.
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ENHANCE COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET?
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The object of the patent law is to secure to inventors of what they
have actuallyinvented or discovered, and it ought not to be defeated
by a too strict and technicaladherence to the letter of the statute
or by the applicationof artificialrules of interpretation.
Justice Brown1

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM WITH REVERSE
PAYMENT PATENT SETTLEMENTS

"It takes on average 10-15 years and more than $800 million ... to bring a new
medicine to consumers." 2 Brand name or pioneer pharmaceutical companies obtain
patents to protect their investment from infringing generic pharmaceutical
companies. 3 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, also known as the
Copyright and Patent Clause, grants Congress the power to create laws that
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."4 Two primary goals of the U.S.
patent system are to provide incentives to invent, and to promptly disclose
information to the public. 5 In exchange for disclosure of information to the public, a
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Chemical Engineering,
University of Illinois at Chicago, May 2003. I would like to thank Bradley M. Taub and Elizabeth
Mirza Al-Dajani for their help and guidance throughout my Comment process. Additionally, thank
you to the staff of THE JOHN MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW for their
invaluable editorial assistance.
Available at www.jmripl.com.
1Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892). The Tophff court discussed the importance of
ownership exclusivity, which patents grant to inventors of innovative technology. Id
2 Paying Off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs."Hearing on S. 316
Before the S. Comm. on the Judieiary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Tauzin Testimon]
(testimony of Billy Tauzin, CEO PhRMA); see, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Development in
the United States from 1963 to 1999, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 286, 292
(2001). Author discusses the time it takes an innovator drug company to introduce a new drug to
the market. Id.
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
"Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore,
infringes the patent."
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
5 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (discussing the goals of patent
laws).
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patent owner obtains "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention" for a limited period of time. 6 Although the U.S. patent
system paves the path for innovation and advancement of technology, 7 it also raises
8
concern over certain antitrust issues.
In most cases, the patent laws are at odds with the antitrust laws. 9 While
patent laws grant limited monopolies, antitrust laws prohibit them. 10 A conflict
occurs between antitrust and patent laws when a pioneer drug company enters into a
settlement agreement with a generic drug company to resolve a patent infringement
lawsuit.11 On such settlement agreement is the "reverse payment" patent settlement
which involves a payment from the pioneer drug company to the generic drug
company, with the promise that the generic drug company will delay its drug entry
into the market. 12 The reverse payment patent settlement is a typical result of
regulatory scheme that controls the pharmaceutical market. 13
Part I of this Comment introduces the problems associated with reverse
payment settlements and explains the principles of patent and antitrust laws. Part I
also examines the intent behind Congress's proposal of the Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act ("PAAGA"). Part II analyzes federal case law, focusing on
the reasoning courts use when reviewing patent infringement settlements,
particularly the reverse payment settlements. Part II also analyzes the interests of
the pioneer drug companies, generic drug companies, and the public. Part III
proposes that the rule of reason must be established as the sole standard when
addressing reverse payment settlements. Part IV concludes that the PAAGA neither
enhances competition in the pharmaceutical industry nor benefits the public.
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2).
7 Tauzin Testimony, supra note 2 (testimony of Billy Tauzin, CEO PhRMA).
8

Paying Off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Hearing on S. 316
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Hirsh Testimon]
(testimony of Merril Hirsh). "The issue involves whether their settlement can take the form of a
payment from the brand company to the generic in exchange for an agreement not to compete." Id.
9 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005). "It is the tension
between restraints on anti-competitive behavior imposed by the Sherman Act and grants of patent
monopolies under the patent laws, as complicated by the Hatch-Waxman Act, that underlies this

appeal." Id.
10John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements.* Fault Lines at the Intersection of
Intellectual Propertyand Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, 11 J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 1, 3 (2006) (noting the courts across the country realize there is a conflict between
exclusionary rights of patentees and its anticompetitive effects in the pharmaceutical industry).
11See id.; see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2nd Cir. 1981) cert denied,
455 U.S. 1016 (1982). The court stated "the patent and antitrust laws necessarily clash." Id.; Image
Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997). "At the border of
intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets lies a field of dissonance yet to be
harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court." Id.
12Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Settlements Between Brand and Generic PharmaceuticalCompanies.*
A Reasonable Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payments, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1884 (2006).
"[S]ettlement agreements fall into several categories, the most prevalent of which involves so-called
'reverse payments' from the patent holder to the alleged infringer, typically in exchange for the
alleged infringer's agreement to delay market entry of a pharmaceutical product or line of products."
Id.
13 In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 390-91.

"[R]everse payments are particularly to be expected in

the drug-patent context because the Hatch-Waxman Act created an environment that encourages
them." Id.
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BACKGROUND: CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAWS

A. Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Effect on the PharmaceuticalIndustry

A pharmaceutical company can market or sell a new drug in the United States
only after the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approves it.14 A pioneer drug
company files a New Drug Application ("NDA")15 with the FDA, submitting extensive
clinical data that proves the new drug's safety and efficacy. 16 In 1984, Congress
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act ("HatchWaxman Act")17 to "make available more low cost generic drugs [and] to create a new
incentive for increased expenditures for research and development of certain
products, which are subject to premarket approval."18 The Hatch-Waxman Act
allows generic drug companies to use clinical studies of the pioneer drug companies
without infringing the patents, thus gaining early entry into the market. 19
Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the only method for a pioneer
2
or a generic drug company to obtain FDA approval of a drug was to file the NDA. 0
Similar to the pioneer drug companies, the generic drug companies were required to
submit safety and efficacy studies for the generic versions of the already patented
drugs. 21 In addition, if a generic drug company conducted safety and efficacy studies
on a generic version of a pioneer drug before the expiration of the patent, it could be
held liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) for infringement. 22 Therefore, Congress enacted
the Hatch-Waxman Act to eliminate these barriers and make it easier for generic
23
versions of the pioneer drugs to gain entry into the pharmaceutical market.

1. The GenericDrug Approval Process
In an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"),24 the generic drug company
25
may use clinical data collected by the pioneer drug company to gain FDA approval.
1'21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). "No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless [a new drug application or an abbreviated new drug
application is approved] with respect to such drug." Id.
15 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
16

Id.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).
18 Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647).
19Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing
the need for enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in the pharmaceutical industry).
17

20 d
21 Id.
22
23

35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006); ValleyDrug Co., 344 F.3d at 1296.
ValleyDrug Co., 344 F.3d at 1296.

24 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006). This section of the Hatch-Waxman Act describes the method by
which a generic drug company must file an abbreviated new drug application. See id.
25 Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 2005). The
Hatch-Waxman Act's abbreviated new drug application process allows the generic drug companies
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As part of the ANDA, the generic drug company must also certify one of four
statements concerning the relevant patent(s) on the pioneer drug: (1) the information
regarding the pioneer drug patent has not been filed; (I) the pioneer drug patent has
expired; (I1) specify the date on which the pioneer drug's patent will expire; or (IV)
the pioneer drug patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or
sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted. 26 Statement IV above is
commonly known as the "Paragraph IV certification." 27 This Comment focuses on
Paragraph IV certification because of its importance in patent infringement lawsuits
filed by pioneer drug companies that lead to the controversial reverse payment
28
settlements.

2. The ANDA CertificationProcess
After the FDA approval, an ANDA filer certifying under Paragraph IV
29
certification must notify the pioneer drug company of its intent to enter the market.
If the pioneer drug company files an infringement lawsuit against the generic drug
company within forty-five days after receiving the notice, then the FDA
automatically institutes a thirty-month delay on the ANDA approval.30 The ANDA
is not approvable until: (1) a court determines that the pioneer drug company's
patent is invalid; or (2) a court determines the generic drug does not infringe the
pioneer patent; or (3) a thirty month time period after the date the pioneer drug
31
company receives notice of the Paragraph IV certification.
The FDA's approval of the generic drug company's ANDA creates competition for
the pioneer drug company in the pharmaceutical market. 32 Therefore, a reverse

to gain early entry into the pharmaceutical market. Id. The Hatch-Waxman Act simplifies the
application process for a generic drug company and avoids the duplication of expensive safety and
efficacy studies, so long as the generic manufacturer proves that its drug is bioequivalent to the
already-approved pioneer drug. Id.
26 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV).
27 See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1333 (2d Cir. 2005).
"[P]ursuant to the requirements of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Teva filed what is termed a
'paragraph IV certification."' d.
28 See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (Dist. D.C. 2000). "A generic drug
manufacturer's filing of a so-called 'Paragraph IV' certification has important legal ramifications. It
automatically creates a cause of action for patent infringement." Id.
29 21 U.S.C. § 355y)(2)(B); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.52. In order to obtain approval from the
FDA to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug before the expiration
of the pioneer drug company's patent, a generic drug company that files an abbreviated new drug
application must send a notice stating that an application that contains data from bioavailability or
bioequivalence studies has been submitted under the Act. Id. The application must also include a
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the generic drug company's opinion as to why it
believes that the pioneer drug company's patent is invalid or will not be infringed. Id.
3021 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Approval of the abbreviated new drug application that is filed
under a Paragraph IV Certification is effective immediately, unless the patent owner of the pioneer
drug brings an action for infringement of its patent within forty-five days of the receipt of the notice
described in the previous endnote. Id. See also Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1060.
31 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
32 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
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payment settlement is likely to occur at the patent infringement lawsuit stage. 33
Reverse payment settlements are at odds with the antitrust laws, because of their
4
anticompetitive qualities.

B. Sherman Antitrust Act

Section One of the Sherman Act states that "Ieivery contract, combination ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade ..., is declared to be illegal."3 5 Historically, only
unreasonable restraints on trade have been considered anticompetitive and in
violation of the Sherman Act.3 6 In the past, the courts have used one of two methods
to address reverse payment settlements: the rule of reason3 7 and the per se illegal
rule.3 8 In Sehering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,3 9 the Eleventh
40
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both the rule of reason and per se illegal rule.

1. Rule ofReason Approach to Antitrust Issues
Under the rule of reason, courts consider a number of factors to determine
whether an agreement concerning trade imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade.
These factors may include: specific information about the relevant business; nature of
the business before and after the restraint was imposed; and the restraint's history,

33 See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); SeheringPlough, 402 F.3d 1056; In -r Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 211
F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla.
2005).
34See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386.
35 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
'36SeeValleyDrug, 344 F.3d at 1303. "[Itt is understood that the ban on 'contract[s] in restraint
of trade' means only unreasonable restraints, that is, restraints that impair competition." Id.
(citation omitted).
'37
See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (noting that a
restraint on trade can be held unreasonable because "itviolates what has come to be known as the
'Rule of Reason,' under which the 'test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition"' (quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918))).
38 See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1303.
"Some types of agreements are so obviously
anticompetitive, or so unlikely to be pro-competitive that such agreements can be deemed to violate
the Sherman Act without much more than an examination of the agreement itself and the
relationships of the parties to the agreement." Id. These agreements are labeled as "per se"
violations of the antitrust laws. Id.
31402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
40 Id. at 1065. The court felt bound by its decision in Valley Drug, where it held that neither
approaches were appropriate for an antitrust analysis of patent cases. Id. The court reasoned that
both approaches seek to determine whether the challenged action has an anticompetitive effect on
the pharmaceutical market. Id. This was not deemed appropriate, because it did not take into
consideration the value of the pioneer drug company's patent. See id.

[7:150 2007]

The Preserve Access To Affordable Generics Act

nature, and effect. 41 When applying the rule of reason, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate the practice had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in
the relevant market. 42 The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish procompetitive effects of the practice. 43 If the defendant is successful, then the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved
through alternative means that are less restrictive of competition. 44 Certain courts
find the anticompetitive effects of a settlement on restraint are so obvious that a
45
lengthy rule of reason approach is not needed.

2. PerSe illegalApproach to AntitrustIssues
A court may analyze restraints on trade as per se illegal if the type of practice
46
involved has a "pernicious effect on competition and lacks of any redeeming virtue."
The court thus presumes the illegality of certain types of practices without
47
considering the intent behind these practices.

41 Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. Justice Brandeis in his famous quote, which has become
the most frequently cited authority on the rule of reason, stated the following:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.

Id.
42

43
44

See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005).

See id.
See id.

45 See, e.g., N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003). There are certain restraints that are deemed per se illegal,
because they have a predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and a very limited potential
for pro-competitive benefit on the relevant market. Id.
4c N. Pae. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. This court noted that certain restraints on trade are so
obvious that it is not necessary to prolong the litigation and to investigate the market. Id.
47 See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 906. "The per se approach thus applies a 'conclusive
presumption' of illegality to certain types of agreements, where it applies no consideration, to the
intent behind the restraint, to any claimed pro-competitive justifications, or to the restraint's actual
effect on competition." Id. (citation omitted).
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3. The Schering-Plough CourtApproaeh
After rejecting both the rule of reason and the per se illegal analysis, 48 the
Sehering-Ploughcourt stated the "ultimate purpose of the antitrust inquiry is to form
49
a judgment with respect to the competitive significance of the restraint at issue."

The court reasoned the anticompetitive results of these settlements are simply due to
ownership of the patent by one of the parties. 50 It stated that because a patent is
presumed to be valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282,51 the patent grants its owner the right to
exclude others from infringing upon the patented invention. 52 Therefore, the court
held that the proper analysis to determine antitrust liability is to examine: "(1) the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
53
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects."

C. The Medicare PrescriptionDrug,Improvement, and ModernizationAct
Congress responded to reverse payment settlements when it amended the
Hatch-Waxman Act as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 ("The Medicare Act"), 54 which included the Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act ("AAPA"). 55 The AAPA made three substantial
48 Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). The
court decided against using either the rule of reason or the per se illegal analysis. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Schering-Ploughfelt bound by its decision in Valley Drug, where it held
that neither approaches were appropriate for an antitrust analysis of patent cases. Id.
49 Id. at 1063 (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303-04 (11th

Cir. 2003)); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the PresumptiveIllegalityApproach to Settlements
of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Jams & Lemley,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1807 (2003).
"[T]he plaintiff often will have an incentive to pay the
defendant not to enter the market, regardless of whether the former expects to win at trial." Id.
5oSeheringPlough, 402 F.3d at 1065-66. The Schering-P]oughcourt noted that by their very
nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, would be considered
anticompetitive. Id. The Schering-Ploughcourt held that the requirement is to analyze the extent
to which the pioneer drug company's patent prevents antitrust laws beyond the exclusionary effects
of the patent. Id.
51 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). See also Doddridge v. Thompson, 22 U.S. 469, 483 (1824) (holding
that "[a] patent is presumed valid until the contrary is shown"); Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Kobrin,
719 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 1983). "Congress recognized the expertise of the patent office on
this matter when it provided for a legal presumption in favor of patent validity for any patent issued
by the patent office." Id.
52 Sehering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1066. See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
53 Sehering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1066.
54 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)).

See also Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals:The Hatch-Waxman Act,
Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY,
602, 618 (2005). "Congress recently enacted and the president singed into law on December 8, 2003,
the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act, which also implements
important changes clarifications to the Hatch-Waxman Act." Id.
55 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395). See also

Joel Graham, The Legality of Hateh-Waxman PharmaceuticalSettlements: Is the Terazosin Test
the ProperPrescription 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 437 (2006). "In response to the perceived
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changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act: (1) pharmaceutical patent infringement
settlements must be filed with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"); (2) only one thirty-month stay will be approved; and
(3) the 180-day exclusivity period belongs only to the first generic drug company that
challenges a pioneer drug company's patent.56

1. Settlements Must Be Filed with FTC & DOJ
The AAPA's first substantial amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act requires the
competing pioneer and generic drug companies that enter into settlements to file
their settlement agreements with the FTC and the DOJ. 57 The FTC reviews reverse
payment patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry to ensure no antitrust
problems are implicated. 58 In the event the settlement agreements violate antitrust
59
laws, the generic drug company forfeits its 180-day exclusivity period.

2. The Thirty-Month Stay
The second substantial amendment modified the thirty-month delay.6 0 Prior to
the Medicare Act, pioneer drug companies who litigated patent infringement lawsuits
could list newer patents related to the challenged patent, thereby generating
successive thirty-month stays. 61 The Medicare Act makes the thirty-month stay
available only for patents listed prior to the ANDA submission that gave rise to the
patent infringement claim. 62 Therefore, the Medicare Act grants only one thirty63
month stay.

problems with the Hatch-Waxman Act, President Bush signed into law the Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act as Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003
(Medicare Act)." Id.
56 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006); see also Graham, supra note 55, at 438-39 (discussing
the changes made to the Hatch-Waxman Act, and codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).
57 See id. at 439.
58 See Barbara J. Williams, A Presentationfor Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-Name
Drug Companies and Delayed Generic DrugMarket Entry, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 58 (2005). The
author stated that in response to the pharmaceutical reverse payment patent settlements the FTC
recommended, inter alia,the "FTC review.., settlement agreements for antitrust purposes." Id.
59 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
(3o21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See also Andrew H. Berks, AntitrustAspects ofthe 'Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals"Act: Incentives for Generics Out the Window?, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1305, 1312 (2006).
(31Berks, supra note 60, at 1310.
(3221 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See also Fazzio, supra note 10, at 14.
(3321 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See also Berks, supra note 60, at 1312. The author explains
that the Access to Affordable Pharmaceutical Act was enacted to modify the thirty-month stay
provision to a single stay for any drug. Id.
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3. The 180-DayExclusivity Period
The third substantial amendment gives the first generic drug company a 180day exclusivity period before the FDA can approve another ANDA.64
This
amendment encourages generic drug companies to challenge pharmaceutical
patents. 65 Under the Medicare Act, the first generic drug applicant is any applicant
who submits a substantially complete ANDA with Paragraph IV certification on the
same day. 66 The 180-day exclusivity period begins after the date of the generic
drug's first commercial marketing. 67

D. Congress Proposes the PreserveAccess to Affordable GenericsAct
After the Medicare Act amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FTC and
other antitrust plaintiffs brought several lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies
alleging antitrust violations involving reverse payment patent settlements. 68 While
certain courts utilized the rule of reason,6 9 other courts held the settlements to be per
se illegal, 70 and the court in Schering-Plough applied a third analysis. 71 After the
Scbering-Plough court held that the agreements between the pioneer and generic
drug companies did not unreasonably restrain trade, 72 the FTC petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 73 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,
failing to settle the uncertainty arising under the reverse payment patent
settlements.7 4 This uncertainty provided Congress with a reason to propose the
75
PAAGA to further amend the Hatch-Waxman Act.
6 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see alsoApotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir.

2003). In Apotex, Circuit Judge Bryson stated "the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to strengthen the
incentives for pharmaceutical development by extending the terms of certain drug patents, and by
providing a 180-day period of generic market exclusivity for approved drugs during which no ANDA
may be filed or approved." Id. (citation omitted).
65 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
(36
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb).
67Id. If the abbreviated new drug application contains a Paragraph IV certification and it is
for a drug for which the applicant is the first to submit the certification, then the application will be
effective 180 days after the first commercial marketing of the generic drug. Id.
68 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005); Valley Drug
Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 (2003); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896,
906 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 211 F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
6 See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 405 (affirming judgment of the district court, and
agreeing that a per se illegal approach was inappropriate, thereby, using the rule of reason
analysis); Valley Drug,344 F.3d at 1313.
70See, e.g., In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915.
71 Sehering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1068.
72 Id. at 1076.
73 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929
(2006) (No. 05-273).
74 Fod. Trade Comm'n, 126 S. Ct. 2929.
7' See The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007).
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On January 17, 2007, a number of Senators introduced the PAAGA to prohibit a
pioneer drug company from paying a generic drug company in order to delay the
generic drug's entry into the pharmaceutical market. 76 The proposed law makes it
unlawful for a pioneer drug company and a generic drug company to enter into a
monetary agreement prohibiting the generic drug company from entering the drug
market prior to the patent life. 77 The proposed law allows settlements only where
the patentee enters into an agreement with a generic drug company allowing an
ANDA filer to enter the market prior to expiration of the patent term. 78 Part II of
this Comment analyzes the three categories of antitrust standards courts use in
79
addressing reverse payment patent settlements.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standardof Review for PatentSettlements
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals used the rule of reason standard in at least
two antitrust cases involving reverse payment patent settlements.8 0 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals used the per se illegal rule to strike down a reverse payment
patent settlement.81 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both standards,
and applied a three-prong test in three lawsuits involving reverse payment patent
settlements.8 2 Many experienced judges and commentators, as well as pioneer and
7)Id.

§ 3.

77 Id. The

Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act made it illegal for anyone to be a party of
a settlement agreement resolving a patent infringement lawsuit over a patented drug in the
pharmaceutical industry, where "(1) an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and (2) the ANDA
filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the ANDA product for any period
of time." Id.
7sId. The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act does not apply to a settlement agreement
of a patent infringement lawsuit, where the value paid by the pioneer drug company to the generic
drug company gives the generic drug company the right to enter the pharmaceutical market earlier
than the expiration of the pioneer patent. Id.
79See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The court recognized that a
reverse payment patent settlement is a specific type of restraint that can be ruled unreasonable
either because it is per se illegal, or because it violates the rule of reason analysis, under which the
test of legality is "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id.; see
also Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1064-65 (11th Cir. 2005).
80 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
SI In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held the agreement between pioneer drug company (HMR) and generic drug
companies (Andrx) was a per se illegal restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, because
the anticompetitive effect in the pharmaceutical market is obvious and transparent. Id.
82 Sehering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065.
To prevail on a claim that a patent infringement
settlement agreement violates the antitrust laws, a plaintiff must prove "(1) the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and
(3) the resulting anticompetitive effects" in the relevant market. Id. at 1066; Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (2003); Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corp.,

421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005).
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generic drug companies have hailed the rule of reason as the prevailing standard in
83
analyzing reverse payment settlements of patent infringement disputes.

1. The Rule ofReason Approach
In December 1985, Barr Laboratories, Inc. ("Barr") filed a Paragraph IV
certification with the FDA to market its generic version of Tamoxifen, a breastcancer drug. 84 Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC ("ICI"), the Tamoxifen patent
holder, sued Barr within forty-five days of receiving the notice for patent
infringement. 85 The lawsuit triggered the thirty-month stay, which meant that Barr
could not market its drug until expiration of the stay or until a court judgment held
that Barr's generic drug did not infringe ICI's patent, or that ICI's patent was
invalid. 86 On April 20, 1992, ICI's patent was held invalid because it wrongfully
87
ICI
withheld relevant material from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
88
appealed the determination to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
In
1993, Zeneca, Inc. acquired the Tamoxifen patent from its predecessor, ICI.89 The
patent would not expire until August 20, 2002.90 While the appeal was pending,
Zeneca and Barr entered into a settlement agreement that included a reverse
payment of $21 million and a license from Zeneca to Barr to sell a generic version of
Tamoxifen. 91
Consumers, providers of medical benefits, and consumer advocacy groups
(collectively "Plaintiffs") brought over thirty actions in multiple districts against the
patent owners of Tamoxifen and the maker of the generic version of the drug
92
(collectively "Defendants"), challenging the validity of the settlement agreement.
The suits were consolidated, and collectively the Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, the
agreement enabled Zeneca and Barr to reuse a patent that the district court had
already held invalid, and allowed Zeneca to continue its monopolization of the
93
market for Tamoxifen.
The district court in In re Tamoxifen held the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted as required under § 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 94 and the Plaintiffs appealed. 95 The Second Circuit took the case on
83E.g., In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 370 (J. Sack); CN Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (J.
Brandeis); In re Ciprofioxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (J. Trager); Sehering
Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065 (J. Fay); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986,
991 (N.D. 11. 2003) (J. Posner).
81See In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 377.
8'Id. See also Imperial Chem. Indus., v. Barr Labs., Inc., 126 F.R.D. 467, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
vacated, 991 F.2d 811 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
86 In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 377.
87 Id.
8 Id
89 Id. (Zeneca, Inc., AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals

(collectively "Zeneca")).
90 d
91 Id.

92 Id.at 380.
93 d

94Id.at 374.

LP, AstraZeneca LP, AstraZeneca PLC
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appeal, and affirmed the district court. 96 The Second Circuit held the test should be
whether the exclusionary effects of the agreement exceeded the scope of the patent's
protection. 97
Similar to the district court's holding in In re Ciprofloxaein
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,98 the Second Circuit refused to consider the
likelihood of the patentee's success at trial to defend its patent. 99 Unlike the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeal's use of the per se illegal standard, the court here declined to
consider the amount of money involved in the reverse payment as the only
determining factor. 100

2. The PerSe IllegalApproaeh
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals used the per se illegal standard in the In re
10 1
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation
case to determine the legality of reverse
10 2
payment patent settlements.
The plaintiffs, who were direct and indirect
purchasers of a heart medication called Cardizem CD, filed complaints against the
patent owner of the drug and the potential generic maker of the drug.10 3 The
plaintiffs challenged the agreement between the pioneer drug company, Hoescht
Marion Roussel, Inc. ("HMR") and the generic drug company, Andrx
104
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Andrx") as a violation of federal and state antitrust laws.
In 1992, HMR began marketing Cardizem CD, with an active ingredient
diltiazem hydrochloride, which is used to treat chronic chest pains, lower high blood
pressure, and prevent heart attacks and strokes.10 5 On December 30, 1995, Andrx
filed a Paragraph IV certification for a generic version of Cardizem CD using
diltiazem hydrochloride as its active ingredient. 106 Andrx was the first generic drug
95 Id.
96 Id.

97 Id. at 398. The court distinguished this case from the In re Ciprofloxacin and the In re
Cardizem cases, where the patents at issue were formulating patents in the patents only covered
specific formulations or delivery methods of compounds. Id. Zeneca's patent is a "patent on a
compound that, by its nature, excludes all generic versions of the drug." Id.
98 363 F. Supp. 2d 548. The Eastern District of New York applied the rule of reason analysis to
determine whether the settlement agreement between the pioneer drug company and the generic
drug company was an unreasonable restraint on trade. Id. The court stated that the first element
of antitrust law that the plaintiffs must prove is that "the challenged agreements had an actual
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market." Id. The court held that plaintiffs did not
provide sufficient evidence to show that the anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement in
the pharmaceutical market for ciprofloxacin were beyond the scope of the patent. Id. The district
court noted that a "patent allows a zone of exclusion within the bounds of its claims, and that zone is
undiminished by any potential invalidity of the claims." Id.
99 In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 387.
100 Id. at 388.
101 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
102 Id. at 915.
103 Id. at 899. Purchasers and users of a heart medication called diltiazem hydrochloride
brought action against the manufacturer of the patented drug and manufacturer of the generic
version of the same drug under the Sherman Act and state antitrust and consumer protection
statutes. Id.
104 Id. at 900.
105 Id. at 901.
106 Id. at 902.
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company to file an ANDA, which entitled it to the 180-day exclusivity period. 10 7 In
January 1996, HMR filed an infringement lawsuit against Andrx triggering the
108
thirty-month stay.
On September 15, 1997, the FDA approved Andrx's ANDA, which allowed it to
enter the pharmaceutical market. 10 9 On September 24, 1997, HMR and Andrx
entered into a settlement agreement, where Andrx agreed not to market its generic
drug until either: Andrx obtaining a favorable, final and unappealable determination
in the infringement case; HMR and Andrx entering into a license agreement; or HMR
entering into a license agreement with a third party. 110 In addition, Andrx agreed
not to exercise its 180-day exclusivity period.111 In exchange, HMR agreed to pay
112
Andrx quarterly payments of $40 million per year.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the reverse payment patent settlement
between HMR and Andrx per se illegal and in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.113 The court considered the rule of reason standard, but decided that per se
treatment of the settlement agreement was the appropriate test. 114 The court held a
per se treatment of a restraint on trade is appropriate where experience with a
certain practice of restraint enables the court to predict that the rule of reason will
condemn it.115 Therefore, in effect, the Sixth Circuit implied that the result of
applying the per se illegal rule to this reverse payment patent settlement would have
116
been the same as applying the rule of reason analysis.

3. The Schering-Plough CourtApproaeh
Schering-Plough is the pioneer drug company that markets K-Dur 20, an
extended-release micro-encapsulated potassium chloride product. 117 K-Dur 20 is a
supplement generally taken in conjunction with prescription medicines for the
treatment of high blood pressure or congestive heart disease. 118 It is important to
note that potassium chloride, which is the active ingredient in K-Dur 20, is commonly
used and not patentable. 119 Schering-Plough owns a patent on the extended-release
coating, which surrounds the potassium chloride in K-Dur 20.120 The expiration date
of the patent was September 5, 2006.121

107 Id.
108 _Td.

lo Id.

109
110

Jj.
Id.

111 Id.

112
113

Id.
Id. at 900.

114

Id.

Id.
110 Id. at 906.
"15

117
118
119

Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.

120 Id.
121

Id.
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In 1995, Upsher-Smith Laboratories ("Upsher") sought FDA approval to market
a generic version of K-Dur 20.122
Schering-Plough sued Upsher for patent
infringement. 123 In 1997, prior to trial, Schering-Plough and Upsher entered into
settlement, where Schering-Plough agreed to pay a substantial amount of money in
royalty fees. 124 Schering-Plough also agreed to license Upsher's cholesterol-lowering
drug. 125
In 1995, ESI Lederle, Inc. ("ESI"), another generic drug company, sought FDA
approval to market its generic version of K-Dur 20 called Micro-K 20.126 ScheringPlough sued ESI for infringing its K-Dur 20 patent. 127 In December 1997, ScheringPlough offered to divide the remaining patent life with ESI, and allow ESI to enter
the market on January 1, 2004.128 ESI accepted this offer, but demanded on
receiving monetary payment to settle the case. 129 At Judge Rueter's suggestion,
Schering-Plough agreed to pay ESI up to $10 million if ESI received FDA approval
for its Micro-K 20.130 The FTC challenged both settlement agreements, and brought
lawsuits against Schering-Plough, Upsher, and ESI for violating the antitrust
laws. 131
In Schering-Plough,the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both the rule
of reason and the per se illegal analysis. 132 The court stated the "ultimate purpose of
the antitrust inquiry is to form a judgment with respect to the competitive
significance of the restraint at issue." 133 The court reasoned the anticompetitive
results of these settlements are simply due to ownership of the patent by one of the
parties. 134 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned because a patent is presumed valid under
35 U.S.C. § 282,135 a "patent grants its owner the right to exclude others" from
infringing upon the patented invention. 136 The Schering-Plough patent gave its
owner the right to exclude others from entering the drug market until September 5,
2006.137
122 d.
123 Id. at

1059.

Id.
125 Id.

124

126

Id. at 1060.

127 _d.

128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131

132
133

Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1063 (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303-04 (11th

Cir. 2003)).
134 Id. at 1065-66. The Schering-Ploug- court noted that by their very nature, patents create
an environment of exclusion, and consequently would be considered anticompetitive. Id. The
requirement is to analyze the extent to which the pioneer drug company's patent prevents antitrust

laws beyond the exclusionary effects of the patent. Id.
135 Jd.; see also Doddridge v. Thompson, 22 U.S. 469, 483 (1824). The Court held "a patent is
presumed valid until the contrary is shown." Id; see also Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Kobrin,
719 F.2d 1114, 1117 (11th Cir. 1983). "Congress recognized the expertise of the patent office on this
matter when it provided for a legal presumption in favor of patent validity for any patent issued by
the patent office." Id
136
137

ScheringPlough,402 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1303-04).
Id. at 1067. In 1986, Schering-Plough received approval from the FDA to sell its KDur 20

tablets. Id
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In the first settlement agreement between the companies, Schering-Plough
licensed Usher to sell its patented product more than five years before expiration of
its patent.138 In the second settlement agreement, Schering-Plough granted ESI a
license to enter the drug market more than two years before its patent expiration.139
The FTC was unable to prove the generic drug companies, Upsher and ESI, could
have entered the market prior to the expiration of the Schering-Plough patent.140
The court found this to be persuasive of the validity and strength of the ScheringPlough patent. 141
Although the FTC argued and complained that these settlements were ScheringPlough's attempts to preserve its monopoly in the pharmaceutical market, the FTC
made no allegation that the Schering-Plough patent was invalid.142 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the FTC had to show these settlements restricted competition
beyond the exclusionary effect of the Schering-Plough patent. 143
Here, the
settlement agreements did not go beyond the exclusionary effect of the patent and
both generic drug challengers received opportunity to enter the market before
expiration of the Schering-Plough patent. 144 Therefore, the settlement agreements
did not exceed the scope of the patent's exclusionary potential. 145 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the settlements were not in violation of antitrust laws. 146

4. The InterestsInvolved in Reverse Payment Patent Settlements
Pharmaceutical patent settlements, which result from Hatch-Waxman
amendments, touch on the interests of the public as well as the generic and pioneer
148
drug companies. 147 The public has an interest in the availability of generic drugs.

Id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1068.
140 Id.
138

139

HI Id.
142Id.
143Id. The court determined that without any evidence provided by the Commission to the
contrary, there is a presumption that Schering-Plough's patent is valid. Id. The patent gives
Schering-Plough the ability to exclude anyone that tries to infringe upon its patented product. Id.
Therefore, the court held that the proper analysis that should be applied must consider whether
there is substantial evidence provided by the Commission to support its conclusion that the
challenged settlement agreements between the pioneer drug company and the two generic drug
companies restrict competition beyond the exclusionary effects of the valid patent. Id. Although the
Commission could not provide sufficient evidence to show either that the Schering-Plough patent is
invalid or that the patent will not be infringed by the two generic drug companies' products, it
dismissed the Eleventh Circuit's prior holding in Valley Drug,which stated that in such a situation
"a determination on the merits of the underlying patent disputes was not supported by law or logic."

Id.
144 Id.

at 1072.

I 5 Id.
146

Id.

See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005). "The trial
court must protect the public interest, as well as the interests of the parties, by encouraging the
most fair and efficient resolution." Id.
147

148 See Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or
Survival of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 250 (2002). Author balances the public's interest
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Medications must not only be available to the public, but also affordable to the
average consumers. 149 The public also has an interest in enforcement of valid
patents. 150 In addition, the public has an interest in settlements of expensive and
lengthy patent infringement litigations. 151 Generally, the public benefits from a
generic drug company's entry into the pharmaceutical market. 152 If successful in
gaining entry, generic drug companies create competition for the pioneer drug
companies in the pharmaceutical market. 153 Generic drug companies challenging a
pharmaceutical patent would gain great financial benefits if the pioneer drug
company's drug patent were to be held invalid. 154 Considering this fact, it is of no
surprise that so many generic drug companies embark upon challenging
pharmaceutical patents.
Generic drug companies distribute and sell drugs at much lower costs to the
public than the pioneer drug companies.1 55 Although entering the pharmaceutical
market is a very compelling factor in litigating a case, a generic drug company's dire
need for financial assistance may motivate it to accept a monetary award and settle a
costly patent infringement battle. 156 On the other hand, a pioneer drug company has
great incentive to protect its patent through settlement agreements once it sees its
interest is being jeopardized. 157
Each of these interests adequately justifies use of the rule of reason standard in
judging reverse payment settlement agreements.1 58 A per se illegal treatment of
reverse payment patent settlements does not give due consideration to the patent
159
exclusivity, public interest, and the interests of the parties involved.
in having inexpensive generic drugs available to public against the need to encourage development
of new drugs. Id.
149

See Mary Atkinson, Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals."
A Comparative Study of the

Law in the UnitedStates and Canada, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 181, 183 (2002). "While the United
States government has an interest in maintaining a healthy pharmaceutical industry, the
government is also concerned with providing the public with affordable drugs." Id.
150 See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 235 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
151See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Judge Posner stated, "Ithe general policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the
policy extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits." Id.
152 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
15: Jennifer Berman, Using the Doctrineof Informed Consent to Improve HIV Vaccine Access
in the Post-TripsEra, 22 WIS. INT'L L. J. 273, 286-87 (2004) (stating that promotion of generic
alternatives of patented drugs creates competition in the pharmaceutical industry).
154See

Alison Ladd, Integra v. Merck: Effects on the Cost andInnovation of New Drug

Products, 13 J.L. & POLY 311, 312 (2005).
55 See id.
"Generic drugs can be sold at much cheaper prices than their brand name
counterparts, in part because their manufacturers can make use of existing research in developing
drug formulas rather than originating this knowledge base." Id.
156 E.g., Schering-Plough v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 2005). During
the settlement agreement, Upsher insisted upon its need for cash prior to the agreed entry date. Id.
157 See

id.

In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386 (2d Cir. 2005). The court
noted that in a majority of cases, reverse payment patent settlements would be evaluated under a
rule of reason analysis. Id. Under the Rule of reason analysis, the fact-finder must decide whether
the challenged practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a
variety of factors, including "specific information about the relevant business, its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect." Id.
159Tauzin Testimony,supra note 2.
158 See
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III. PROPOSAL
This Comment proposes that Congress's proposed PAAGA is not necessary in
light of the current antitrust analysis available to the courts, the public policy
concerning settlements, and the interests of the parties involved.

A. PublicPolicy EncouragesSettlements of PatentDisputes
Courts recognize that public policy encourages settlements. 160 The Eleventh
Circuit, in Schering-Ploughstated, "[there is no question that settlements provide a
number of private and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects
of litigation." 161 Patent litigations are complex, lengthy, and expensive for all parties
involved.162 The overall patent litigation cost in the United States is about one
billion dollars per year.1 63 The average patent infringement case lasts thirty-seven
months until the court of appeals makes a decision. 164
1 65
Settlements create a sense of certainty and closure to ongoing litigation.
Some pioneer drug companies would prefer the certainty of settlements to even a
miniscule possibility that a court may hold their patents invalid. 166 Moreover,
reverse payments do not undermine the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In fact,
parties using monetary compensations are better able to settle their differences.167
Certain reverse payment settlements result in the pioneer drug company's purchase

160 See, e.g., Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
see also Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1072; In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386; Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP,
Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 477 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Are Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976); In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
161 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1075.
162 See Tauzin Testimony, supranote 2.
163 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1095. Patent litigation incurs both direct and indirect costs
on the litigants. [d. These costs range from attorney and expert witness fees to the expenses
associated with discovery compliance. Id. Other costs associated with patent litigations are for a
variety of reasons, whether they are the "result of uncompromising legal positions, differing
strategic objectives, heightened emotions, lawyer incompetence, or sheer moxie." -,d. See also
Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE. J. REG. 359, 380 (1999)
(declaring that U.S. patent litigation costs one billion dollars annually).
164 Tauzin Testimony, supra note 2.
165 See Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1075. The Sehering-Ploughcourt stated, "[t]he intensified
guesswork involved with lengthy litigation cuts against the benefits proposed by a rule that
forecloses a patentee's ability to settle its infringement claim." Id.
166 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). In regard to
reverse payment patent settlement, the court stated, "[w]hatever the degree of the patent holder's
certainty, there is always some risk of loss that the patent holder might wish to insure against by
settling." Id.
107 See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
"But any settlement agreement can be characterized as involving 'compensation' to the defendant,
who would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement." Id. Judge Richard
Posner noted that if any settlement agreement, which involved a payment from the pioneer drug
company to the generic drug company to settle a patent infringement dispute, is classified as
involving a "forbidden reverse payment," then there will not be anymore patent settlements. Id.
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of a license for the generic drug company's other products. 168 Such an agreement
benefits the public through introduction of a new rival into the market, which will
create competition. 169

B. ProhibitingReverse Payments Will DiscouragePatent Settlements
Congress's proposed PAAGA makes all reverse payment settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry per se illegal. 170 Congress's per se illegal approach to
reverse payment patent settlements gives no deference to the patentee's right to
exclude others from infringing upon its patent.171 Congress's newly proposed law is
in direct conflict with the 35 U.S.C § 282, which states that a "patent shall be
1 72
presumed valid."
Congress assumes, because the patentee enters into a reverse payment
173
agreement with the alleged infringer, that its patent must be weak or invalid.
Courts have stated that a per se illegal treatment of monetary payments from
pioneer drug companies to generic drug companies would chill patent settlements. 174
In fact, the Schering-Plough court rejected a per se ruling that "would automatically
invalidate any agreement where a patent-holding pharmaceutical manufacturer
settles an infringement case by negotiating the generic drug's entry date, and, in an
ancillary transaction, pays for other products licensed by the generic." 175 The court
provided several reasons for rejecting per illegal standard: "the costs of lawsuits to
the parties, the public problems associated with overcrowded court dockets, and the
correlative public and private benefits of settlements." 176 In addition, monetary

168 See, e.g., Sehering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075. In the first agreement, Schering-Plough and
Upsher negotiated a three-part license deal, where Schering-Plough would pay to Upsher: (1) sixty
million dollars in initial royalty fees; (2) ten million dollars in milestone royalty payments; and (3)
ten to fifteen percent royalties on the sales of the drug. Id. In the second agreement, ScheringPlough would make a payment of fifteen million dollars in return for its right to license generic
enalpril and buspirone from ESI. [d.
169 See Asahi Glass Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994. "[J]n contrast, the settlements led to increased
competition." Id.
170 The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007). Congress noted
that any monetary payment from the pioneer drug company to the generic drug company, which is
followed by the exclusion of the generic drug from entering the pharmaceutical market prior to the
expiration of the patent life is considered as per se illegal. Id.
171Yvon, supra note 12, at 1908. The author correctly noted that while patents may be subject
to legal challenges, the presumption of validity stated by the Congress means that a challenger must
bear the burden of proof to provide sufficient evidence to show that the challenged patent is in fact
invalid. Id.
172 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). "Each claim of a patent whether in independent, dependent, or
multiple dependent form shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claim;
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an
invalid claim." Id.
173 So Sehering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1076.
174 E.g., Asahi Glass Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994. "If any settlement agreement is thus to be
classified as involving a forbidden 'reverse payment,' we shall have no more patent settlements." Id.
175 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1076.
176 Id.
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compensations are an integral part of settlements, without which settlements will be
cumbersome. 177

C. Certain Commentators ErroneouslyChallenge the Validity ofRe verse Payment

Patent Settlements
Certain commentators observe if reverse payments are held per se illegal, then
the pioneer and generic drug companies cannot negotiate sharing a monopoly in the
market. 178 They argue such a holding will force the interested parties to negotiate a
date when the generic can enter the market. 179 In such a scenario, the generic drug
company's incentive to gain entry into the market increases.18 0 However, these
commentators fail to realize that many alleged infringers may not be able to obtain
favorable rulings from the courts that will enable them to enter the market. 181
Several factors contribute to a generic drug company's willingness to enter into
settlement agreement with the pioneer drug company: (1) the lack of funds and other
resources to continue the patent litigation;18 2 (2) the uncertainty over how the
lawsuit will be resolved;18 3 (3) the incentive of gaining an early entry into the
market;18 4 and (4) the monetary award to conduct research and market its drugs.185
Each one of these factors alone is a strong reason for a generic drug company to enter
into a settlement agreement with the pioneer drug company.
A commentator argued the Hatch-Waxman Act "actually encourages
litigation."18 6 Mr. Merril Hirsh, in a senate judiciary hearing, asserted the goals of
the Hatch-Waxman Act are not met when pioneer and generic drug companies
settle.18 7
Rather, it is better to litigate these patent cases than to allow
settlements.188 These statements are in direct conflict with the often-quoted public
177 See Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals noted "any settlement agreement can be characterized as involving 'compensation'
to the defendant, who would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement." Id.
17s See Hirsh Testimony, supra note 8.
179 Id.
180 Id. If the pioneer drug companies and the generic drug companies are prevented from
entering into settlement agreements where the pioneer drug company pays a monetary award to the
generic drug company to resolve a patent infringement lawsuit, then their negotiation will be
different. Id. According to Merril Hirsh, these parties will no longer be able to share a monopoly
over the pharmaceutical market by themselves. Id.
181 Tauzin Testimony, supra note 2.
182 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 2005).
The generic drug company and the pioneer drug company agreed to September 1, 2001 as the
generic drug company's earliest entry date into the pharmaceutical market. Id. This settlement
agreement allowed the generic drug company to enter the pharmaceutical market about five years
prior to the expiration of the pioneer drug company's patent life for K-Dur 20. Id. However, the
generic drug company insisted that it had a need for cash prior to the agreed entry date. Id.
183 Tauzin Testimony, supranote 2.
181See Sehering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1059-60. Both generic drug companies entered into
settlement agreements with the pioneer drug company in exchange for early entry into the market
and monetary awards from the pioneer drug company to the two generic drug companies. Id.
185 See id. at 1060.
186 Hirsh Testimony, supra note 8.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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D. The PreserveAccess to Affordable GenericsAct NeitherEnhances Competitionin
the PharmaceuticalMarket Nor Benefits the Public
Congress proposed the PAAGA amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act to
respond to concerns about the anticompetitiveness of certain reverse payment patent
settlements. 190 Congress's concern that there is a need to address antitrust issues
involving patent infringement settlements in the pharmaceutical industry is well
justified. However, the PAAGA will have the effect of freezing settlements under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 191
Proposed amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act will substantially harm the
pioneer and generic drug companies as well as the public. Generic drug companies
will be forced to litigate patent infringement lawsuits to their finality, because there
will be no real incentives for them to settle. 192 Certain generic drug companies may
drop their Paragraph IV certification because of the very costly and timely patent
litigation process. 193 Other generic drug companies may not even be able to obtain a
favorable ruling from the courts that will enable them to enter the pharmaceutical
market. On the other hand, pioneer drug companies will have no other choice but to
litigate the patent infringement lawsuits. The pioneer drug companies will have no
other means to revert the danger of losing the rights awarded to them through U.S.
1 94
issued patents, which will ultimately lead to the loss of their market power.
Therefore, pioneer and generic drug companies will choose to litigate and will be
forced to transfer the costs of litigation to the consumers.
Given the rich and extensive experience of the courts in dealing with antitrust
issues,1 95 Congress should reject the proposed amendments and defer to the courts'
judgments. The Hatch-Waxman Act and antitrust laws are adequate in addressing
reverse payments within the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, the U.S. Supreme
Court's refusal to grant writ of certiorari to both the Scbering-Plough and In re
Tamoxifen lawsuits, where both courts held the settlements valid, infer that the
Supreme Court concluded the settlements were appropriately valid given the
189 See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. 11. 2003).
190 The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007).
191 Tauzin Testimony, supra note 2.
192 Hirsh Testimony, supra note 8.
193 Tauzin Testimony, supra note 2; see also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,

429 F.3d 370, 390 (2d Cir. 2005).
194Hirsh Testimony, supra note 8.
195 Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill.
2003); In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 386 (2d Cir.
2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering
Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 211 F.R.D. 249
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005); FlexFoot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469,
477 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976).
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circumstances of those cases. However, Congress's proposed amendments make the
settlements involved in both of these lawsuits per se illegal.
As stated earlier, the In re Tamoxifen court used the rule of reason to analyze
validity of the reverse payment patent settlement involved in that lawsuit. 196 The
U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to overturn the Second Circuit court's
holding in In re Tamoxifen if it thought the court's holding conflicted with the intent
of the Hatch-Waxman Act or antitrust laws. Although the In re Tamoxifen case was
rightly decided, the U.S. Supreme Court should grant writ of certiorari to hear a
similar case dealing with reverse payment patent settlement in order to establish a
uniform set of antitrust standards in the pharmaceutical industry.

CONCLUSION

Congress's proposed PAAGA holds all reverse payment patent settlements,
which prohibit generic drug companies from entering the drug market prior to the
patent life, per se illegal. 197 A per se illegal rule presumes the invalidity of a
settlement simply because the agreement involves a reverse payment from a pioneer
drug company to the generic drug company. 198 The per se illegal approach does not
provide the parties with an opportunity to defend their settlement agreements. This
approach essentially holds either the patent holder's patent is invalid or the generic
pharmaceutical company's drug does not infringe upon the pioneer pharmaceutical
company's patent without ruling on the merits. The per se illegal rule disregards the
very important notion of the presumption of patent-validity established by Congress
and deeply rooted in the U.S. patent system. 199
Traditional analysis of the rule of reason must be applied to determine the
validity of the reverse payment patent settlements under the antitrust laws. The
rule of reason is the perfect link that resolves the conflicts between antitrust and
patent laws. A U.S. Supreme Court ruling establishing the rule of reason as the sole
analysis for determining validity of reverse payment patent settlements under the
antitrust laws is vital for a stabilized pharmaceutical market. This ruling will
suppress any doubts as to whether a fair analysis is being applied to a reverse
payment patent settlement and whether a settlement violates antitrust laws.

196 In re Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 370.

The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007).
In re Ca-rdizem, 332 F.3d at 906.
199 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). See also Sure Plus Mfg. Co. v. Kobrin, 719 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (11th
Cir. 1983). The court recognized that Congress provided for a legal presumption in favor of patent
validity for any patent issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
197
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